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Supplemental Brief of Petitioner
INTRODUCTION

The Court ordered the parties to show cause why the State's petition should
not be dismissed "based on standing and/ or mootness." Order to Show Cause. The
Court is concerned that the State is not asking it to change the outcome- affirming
Defendant's conviction.
The court of appeals held that the trial court committed a Doyle error. But it
affirmed the conviction because the error was not prejudicial. The State asked for,
and the Court granted, review on the first holding. The State did not ask to upset
the second.
The State has standing and the case is not moot. The State did prevail in the
judgment on lack-of-prejudice grounds and does not ask to upset that holding.
But the alternative error holding will erroneously impede its ability to present
valuable evidence in future trials, and the State will have no meaningful means of
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review. The Court consequently should not dismiss the petition. But if it does, it
should vacate the alternative holding.
ARGUMENT

I.
AS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, THE STATE HAS STANDING TO
APPEAL AND THE CASE IS NOT MOOT BECAUSE THE
COURT CAN GRANT THE STATE RELIEF

Relying on State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994), and Geer v. Kadera, 671
N.E.2d 692 (Ill. 1996), this Court opined that "it does not appear that a decision by
this Court regarding the proper interpretation of Doyle will affect the result in this
case" and requested that the parties show cause why the petition should thus not
be dismissed "based on standing and/ or mootness." Order to Shau, Cause.
This Court should not dismiss the petition. The State has standing to appeal
because it is aggrieved by the court of appeals' holding that the State committed a

Doyle violation and this Court can grant the State relief from that adverse holding.
A.

The State has standing to appeal because it is aggrieved by the
court of appeals' holding that its actions violated the United States
Constitution.
To have standing to appeal, a party "must be aggrieved by a judgment or

order." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). Normally, a
prevailing party does not have standing to appeal because he is not aggrieved by a
favorable judgment. Id. See also Geer v. Kadera, 671 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Ill. 1996) (" a
party cannot complain of error which does not prejudicially affect it, and one who
has obtained by judgment all that has been asked for in the trial court cannot
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appeal from the judgment."). But this is not always true. "In an appropriate case,
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the
merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as the
party retains a stake in the appeal. ... " Roper, at 445 U.S. at 334. In other words,
so long as a prevailing party is "aggrieved" by an adverse holding, it has standing
to appeal. Id.
Many courts have thus determined that a prevailing party has standing to
appeal an adverse holding of a lower court. See Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas &

Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) (holding that prevailing party had standing to appeal
where ruling on immaterial issue might later be basis for collateral estoppel);

Roper, 445 U.S. at 333-336 (holding that prevailing party had standing to appeal
immaterial class certification ruling); Immigration and Naturalization Service v.

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930-931 (1983) (holding that government, although it
prevailed below, had standing to appeal because it "was sufficiently aggrieved by
the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise
take"); Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.3d 1371, 1375-1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(holding that government, even though prevailing party, had standing to appeal
lower court's reasoning where government was forced to adopt it on remand);

Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 263 n.6 (3rd Cir.
1991) (holding that prevailing party, a federal agency, had standing to appeal
because court's dismissal of count could work a collateral estoppel against it in
another case); Department of Defense, Office of Dependents Schools v. Federal Labor
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Relations Authority, 879 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that agency had standing
to appeal favorable dismissal based on adverse legal premise that agency head
had no power to review and disapprove of collective bargaining agreements);
Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275-1276 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding

that prevailing party had standing to appeal favorable judgment where lower
court dismissed without prejudice alternate state-law claims, leaving prevailing
party open to further litigation); Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 656 F.3d
1129, 1139-1141 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that government had standing to appeal
unfavorable ruling because ruling constrained its discretion on remand even
though it prevailed in final judgment).

Cmnreta v. Greene is particularly relevant here. 563 U.S. 692 (2011).

In

Greene, the United States Supreme Court held that a government official had
standing to appeal the circuit court's adverse holding that the official's conduct
violated the Constitution even though the official prevailed in the judgment
because the circuit court also held that he was entitled to governmental immunity.

Id. at 699.

The Supreme Court explained that the official was sufficiently

aggrieved to maintain standing because "only by overturning the ruling on appeal
can the official gain clearance to engage in the conduct in the future." Id. at 702703. Standing thus "will often be met when immunized officials seek to challenge
a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution." Id. at 703-704.

Greene identified two "policy reaso[ns] ... of sufficient importance" that
further supported standing. Id. at 704 (omission in original) (quoting Roper, 445
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U.S. at 336 n.7). First, the circuit court's holding established "controlling law" that
would have a "significant future effect on the conduct of public officials." Id. at
704-705.

And even though the "Court reviews judgments, not statements in

opinions," "a constitutional ruling in a qualified immunity case is a legally
consequential decision," "not mere dicta or statements in opinions." Id. at 704, 713
(quotation marks and citation omitted). See also id. at 708 ("No mere dictum, a
constitutional ruling preparatory to a grant of immunity creates law that governs
the official's behavior.").
Second, if the Supreme Court had declined to hear the case, the government
was limited in seeking review of the circuit court's holding. Id. Indeed, it put the
official in the '"unenviable choice"' of either acquiescing "in a ruling that he had
no opportunity to contest in this Court, or 'defy the views of the lower court,
adhere to practices that have been declared illegal, and thus invite new suits."" Id.
at 708 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 240-241 (2009)).
For these same reasons, the State is aggrieved by the court of appeals'
"ruling that [its] conduct violated the Constitution." Id. at 703-704. And only by
overturning the ruling on appeal can the [State] gain clearance to engage in
[constitutional] conduct in the future." Id. at 702-703.
Moreover, the same two important reasons that supported standing in

Greene support the State's standing here. First, the court of appeals' erroneous
holding will have binding precedential effect that will bar the State from using
evidence that the United States Constitution does not prohibit it from using. As

-5-
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explained in the State's merits briefs, Doyle only prohibits the State from using a
defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony that
offers an exculpatory explanation. Doyle does not, however, prohibit using post-

Miranda statements that conflict with the exculpatory trial testimony.
The court of appeals held, however, that certain post-Miranda statements are
the equivalent of silence and cannot be used to impeach the exculpatory trial
version. And as explained there, Defendant's post-Miranda statements conflicted
with his trial testimony. Defendant feigned ignorance of the crime when he spoke
to police. At trial, however, he told the jury that he knew all about the crime and
asserted that it was an accident. Those two versions cannot be reconciled and
Supreme Court precedent allowed the State to explore that conflict. And even
though the court affirmed on lack-of-prejudice grounds, its alternative error
holding bans the use of constitutionally admissible evidence in future cases.
Second, the State is effectively foreclosed from seeking review of this
important constitutional question. Like the government in Greene, the State is in
the '"unenviable choice"' of either acquiescing "in a ruling that [it] had no
opportunity to contest in this Court, or 'defy the views of the lower court, [and]
adhere to practices that have been declared illegal."" Id. at 708. Indeed, the only
potential avenue of review would arise if (1) a prosecutor violates McCallie's rule
and uses a defendant's "silence-equivalent" statements against him at trial; (2)
either (a) defense counsel does not object and the trial court does not intervene, or
(b) defense counsel objects but the trial court overrules the objection contrary to
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McCallie; (3) defendant is convicted and appeals; (4) the court of appeals
determines that there is both a McCallie error and the error is prejudicial; and (5)
this Court accepts certiorari review. The State is thus aggrieved by the court of
appeals' holding and has standing sufficient to maintain this Court's review.

Geer v. Kadera - the case cited in the Court's Order to Show Cause- does not
change this conclusion. In Geer, an appellate court affirmed dismissal of Geer's
suit and, in dicta, invited him to pursue a common law wrfr of mandamus. 671
N.E.2d at 694-695. Geer did so. Id. at 695. Kadera-not Geer-sought certiorari
II

review of the first dismissed case, seeking reversal of the ruling" that a writ of
mandamus may lie. Id. The Geer court held that Kadera did not have standing to
appeal because he had prevailed below, the statement about mandamus was nonbinding dicta, and the court had no power to decide whether mandamus may lie
in a different pending case involving different parties. Id. at 699-700.
Unlike here, Kadera was not aggrieved. Id. And the policy reasons
supporting standing were not present- there was no binding adverse holding of
constitutional dimensions of which he likely could not seek judicial review. Id.
II

Indeed, as Greene explained, "a constitutional ruling" - even if immaterial" given
the ultimate resolution of the case-"is a legally consequential decision," "not
mere dicta." 563 U.S. at 704, 713. See also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2
(1992) (explaining that "[h]armless-error analysis is triggered only after the
reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed"); State v. Hummel,
2017 UT 19, if 38, _ P.3d _ ('' [T]he principle of stare decisis is focused on holdings

-7-
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of our prior decisions."). Kadera was not subject to a constitutional ruling. The
State is. And Kadera could have challenged whether mandamus was appropriate
in the mandamus proceeding. As shown, the State has no realistic avenue to
review the court of appeals' holding.
In sum, the State has standing to appeal the court of appeals' erroneous
constitutional holding. This Court should not dismiss the petition.
B.

This case is not moot because the Court can grant the State relief.

A case becomes moot when a petitioner '"no longer suffers actual injury
that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."' Keller Tank Seros. II, Inc. v.

Comm'r of Internal Revenue,_ F.3d

_J

2017 WL 1424973 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1166) (10th Cir. 2016)). See also Chafin v. Chafin,
11

133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) ( To say that an appeal is moot means that the court
cannot provide the prevailing party with any relief.").

11

This is ordinarily a low

bar, [so] 'when a court can fashion some form of meaningful relief, even if it only
partially redresses the grievances of the prevailing party, the appeal is not moot."'

Con.stand v. Cosby, 833 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Continental
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Here, the Court can grant the State relief by reversing the court of appeals'
holding that prohibits it from using constitutionally admissible evidence.

Cf

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930-931 (1983) (holding that government could obtain relief
from "Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would
otherwise take").
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State v. Sims does not hold otherwise. 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). Unlike
here, in that case, this Court determined that the writ of certiorari was
improvidently granted because the petitioner challenged only the lower court's
state constitutional holding, but not its separate federal constitution holding. As a
result, any decision the Court made could not grant the petitioner relief. Id. at 841.
But as shown in Point A, a favorable ruling here can grant the State relief.
Even if this case were technically moot, it still should not be dismissed
because it meets the public interest exception to the mootness rule. The court of
appeals' holding (1) affects the public interest, (2) is likely to recur, and (3) is likely
to evade review. See State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ,I7, 357 P.3d 547. As explained
above, McCallie bars the State from using constitutionally admissible evidence in
every criminal trial. Yet, the State is unlikely to be able to get review unless it and
the trial court abandon their professional, legal, and moral duty to follow the law.
For these reasons as well, this Court should not dismiss the petition as moot.
C.

VJJ

If the Court dismisses the petition, it should also vacate the court
of appeals' holding.
If this Court, however, determines that the State lacks standing or that the

case is otherwise moot, the State asks this Court to vacate the portion of the court
of appeals' opinion that holds that the trial court violated Doyle. Cf Utah R. App.
P. 30(a) (granting appellate court right to "reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise
dispose of any order or judgment appealed from").

-9-
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In Greene, the United States Supreme Court held that while the petitioner
who prevailed below had standing to appeal an adverse holding, the case had
become moot on appeal. See Greene, 563 U.S. at 713-714. Nonetheless, the Court
vacated the portion of the circuit court's decision of which the petitioner sought
review. Id. This prevented "an unreviewable decision 'from spawning any legal
consequences,' so that no party is harmed." Id. at 713 (quoting United States v.

Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950)). A "'party who seeks review of the merits
of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ... ought
not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in' that ruling." Id. at 712. See also Delaivare
Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 263 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1991)
(vacating lower court's ruling on immaterial count to "eradicate[] any preclusive
effect" on prevailing party).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should not dismiss the petition.
Respectfully submitted on April 28, 2017.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

(~-~
TERA J. PETERSON

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Petitioner
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